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GOING PUBLIC: SELL THE SIZZLE OR THE STEAK?
ABSTRACT
Two samples of high-technology companies that went public in
different time periods show about a 50-50 split between early stage
("selling the sizzle") and later ("selling the steak") actions. More
significant benefits accrue to the larger and later firms. The larger
companies are better prepared for and in greater control of their
decisions to go public. They more carefully search for and find higher
quality underwriters. Their deals cost them less in direct and total
costs, as well as in warrant dilution of their stock. Their stock sales
go smoothly and they even gain surprisingly in immediate after-market
price appreciation, although this differential benefit is not sustained
over the smaller companies. After the fact the larger firms feel that
they had also benefited more in regard to acquisitions, personal
entrepreneurial liquidity and employee perqs.
Both large and small technological firms do meet their goals of raising
needed capital through going public. And neither group feels it has
incurred meaningful disadvantages in the process. However, the smaller
firms experience the clear advantage of survival, in that many would
have gone under had the public offering not succeeded.
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GOING PUBLIC: SELL THE SIZZLE OR THE STEAK?
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
An old adage in going public is "sell the sizzle or sell the steak". Two
"going public" samples indicate that technical firms tend to split 50-50
between trying to sell "sizzle" or "steak". The timing of an issue is jointly
determined by the companies' internal needs for funds and the conditions of the
securities markets, ranked by the entrepreneurs as comparable in importance.
Larger companies rate market considerations as a more important factor than
the small companies, for which capital had generally become a critical
requirement.
In most situations a technical company needs to find an investment
banking firm that will agree to underwrite a public offering. This involves
decision-making by two parties -- the technological firm and the investment
banker -- both of which apply their own search, evaluation and decision
criteria. While the larger technical companies carefully seek out underwriting
houses which meet their concerns, the smaller companies are far less
sophisticated, approaching investment banking firms more or less at random.
Underwriters in turn express ordered preferences toward the capabilities and
depth of management of the young company, the future growth prospects of the
firm and its industry, and the past record of the company.
Key areas of deal negotiation include the market value of the technical
firm, the percentage of the company to be offered, the price per share and the
underwriter's compensation. Needless-to say no underwriter indicates it
adopts a textbook approach to valuation. For companies with a record of
earnings, especially the more established firms, the underwriters tend loosely
to apply price-earnings (P/E) ratios of "similar" firms to reflect current
market conditions, but a wide variation of a 5 to 1 range in P/E ratios results.
Statistical tests find little correlation between these ratios and the size of
the companies or their sales growth rates. The most cogent explanation is that
the spread in the P/E ratios reflects the effects of industry fads, special
circumstances of the companies and different timing relative to "hot" markets.
Offering prices for the underwritten companies studied range from
$0.50 per share up to $22.00 per share, with a median price of $9.50. These
initial prices correlate with factors related to the size of the company,
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including net worth, total assets and revenues, with revenues alone explaining
63 percent of the variance in the offering price.
Many entrepreneurs find the underwriter's discount and commissions
and the total accounting, legal and underwriting expenses quite high relative to
their prior expectations. The underwriter's discount or spread, expressed as a
percentage of the offering price, varies from a low of 6.0% to a high of 18.4%.
The spread is negatively correlated with the price of the stock, indicating a
higher spread for the lower priced offerings, and tends to be less during "new
issues" markets. Another important underwriter compensation are the
warrants that are sold by the company to the underwriter at a nominal charge,
required by underwriters of the smaller issues, requested by some other
underwriters but not by those doing the largest underwritings.
In organizing to move the stock the underwriter creates a distribution
network of retail and institutional brokers, ranging in the samples from a
single firm, carrying out a "best efforts" underwriting, to a full commitment
co-managed transaction which includes 83 underwriters. As expected the
larger dollar volume transactions have the larger number of underwriters, with
the large underwriters distributing the stock far more widely.
Opening day price changes vary dramatically across the sampled firms,
with larger companies escalating more on opening day than smaller firms. In
addition issues made during a hot "new issues" market tend to appreciate more
than those made outside this time period. Neither the size of the underwriting
firm, the sales growth rate of the company, nor the price-earnings ratio at the
offering price relates significantly with the first-day price change. Analyses
of the stock price data after ten trading days, after one month, after 40 trading
days, and after three months show an increasing spread of the results over
time. Sales growth rate of the company prior to going public shows up as
statistically related to price growth of the stock in these slightly longer
period market studies.
Despite the concerns raised by many entrepreneurs prior to going public,
few of them think that public ownership now has an important effect on the
way they run their businesses. A few remarked that it has affected their long
range growth goals. The majority of the entrepreneurs claim that they are not
doing anything now that they would not have done had they remained a privately
held corporation.
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Most aspects of going public apparently favor the larger technical firm,
the one selling the steak, not just the sizzle. But if the principal purpose of
going public is to raise needed capital, then both large and small firms meet
their goals. In contrast with most other perceived benefits, however, one
clear advantage from the received capital is gained by the smaller companies,
many of which in their own founders' judgments would have gone under had the
public offering not succeeded. For the smaller companies going public is not
equivalent in their own eyes to achieving success, rather it is a crucial step
enabling their process of building a technological enterprise to continue.
GOING PUBLIC: SELL THE SIZZLE OR THE STEAK?*
For many technological firms going public is a logical step in their
continuing growth. The capital made available from the public offering helps
fund accelerated product development programs, enables the broadening of
their distribution channels, and generates financial strengthening through debt
retirement. Yet success is a many-colored fabric. To some technological
entrepreneurs "going public" is success, not just part of further "growing up".
As one entrepreneur philosophized, "I built this company up from scratch, made
it profitable and growing, and brought it public. Now it's time for me to step
aside and let these other fellows run the company." Especially from the
perspective of personal fulfillment, bringing the firm from being privately held
into public ownership, with the company's stock traded and reported daily
(more-or-less), engenders strong feelings of pride of accomplishment. For
those entrepreneurs with high need for achievement, going public creates new
tangible measures of attainment.
Whether another part of corporate growth or a first measure of company
success, personal financial success of the entrepreneur is also usually
solidified, and even somewhat enhanced, by going public. Some of the
entrepreneurs sell a portion of their ownership as part of the initial public
offering and transform paper wealth into cash. These and other entrepreneurs,
as well as the early investors in the company and the usually many
stockholding employees, soon begin to sell portions of their stock into the
public market, as allowed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
regulations. The realized liquidity of their previously illiquid assets generates
for many of them thousands and even millions of dollars. For all entrepreneurs
and their stockholding associates, going public makes the paper assets they
still hold much more real, valued tangibly by an existing outside market into
which they at least conceptually can sell their holdings. And almost always,
the pricing of their shares of stock by the public market is considerably higher,
even at the time of initial public offering, than their prior inhouse prices,
thereby increasing their perceived wealth.
This article is based on materials included in E. B. Roberts, Entrepreneurs in
High-Technology: Lessons from MIT and Beyond (New York: Oxford University
Press, forthcoming 1991). The author expresses deep appreciation to his three
former graduate students, Harold Bogle, Andrew Gutman and Charles
McLaughlin, for their critical efforts in data collection and analysis.
2As indicated, going public produces for almost all entrepreneurs capital
needed by their firms, enabling them to continue to grow toward fulfilling
their company goals. Corporate success may thus follow going public as a
consequence in part of the strengthened financial capacity of the firm. This
occurs directly via the increased working capital produced by the public
offering. But it may also occur indirectly through enhanced access to capital
markets, both debt and equity, for the future needs of the firm. The publicly
traded stock certainly makes it easier for the company to attract and/or hold
on to key employees through the stock-based incentives that become available.
That public stock may in addition facilitate acquisitions of other companies or
product lines, if these are part of the firm's strategy. Many entrepreneurs
report that the enhanced image and reputation derived from being a public
corporation even improve their ability to sell products and services.
Such a stream of benefits does not come without costs. The most
obvious is that going public is itself a very costly process, consuming not only
significant time of the key managers of the firm but also a substantial part of
the proceeds of the public stock sale for commissions to the underwriters and
brokers and for the sizable expenses of lawyers, accountants and printers.
Less visible initially, but for some entrepreneurs a greater real cost after the.
fact, are the continuing requirements for the changed conduct of a public
corporation, with quarterly reports, annual meetings, continuous public
visibility and scrutiny, demanding time and patience of officers as well as
increased overhead costs. "Living in a fishbowl" is a new and often unwelcome
consequence for the entrepreneurs who may previously have run their firms in
their own private ways. To some entrepreneurs the most painful aspect of this
public existence is the perceived pressure they sense for short term
performance. This is an anathema to those who believe that their company's
destiny and competitive advantage are only achievable through long term
technology and product development. For some entrepreneurs the benefits with
customers of their improved public relations seem countered by the increase of
company information now made readily available to competitors. And to others
the fear of loss of control of their "baby" to outside stockholders looms large,
whether realistic or not.
Many books have been written for many years on the whys and
wherefores of going public. The technology-based firm is not without specific
guidance in this regard. Among the most recent and most thorough of these
3guides is the Peat Marwick publication, Going Public: What the High Technology
CEO Needs to Know (1987). This article does not present a how-to perspective.
Rather, it reports the results of research studies of technological enterprises
that have gone public. The article covers decisions by entrepreneurs to seek
public market funding, their search process for investment
bankers/underwriters, the negotiations with the underwriters including the
underwriters' decision criteria, and the outcomes of the public offerings, both
in terms of stock performance and impacts upon the companies. Surprisingly,
despite the obvious significance of going public to the entrepreneurial firm,
few research papers on the subject appear in six recent annual volumes of
Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research and only one paper appears in the issues
of Journal of Business Venturing. The experiences of Japanese firms that go
public are described in one recent report. (Systems Science Institute, 1989)
MEASURES AND METHODS
The data sources for this article are focused studies of two samples
generated fourteen years apart, each covering approximately a three year
period of "going public" activities. For each sample comprehensive lists were
prepared of all the New England area technologically-oriented companies that
had their initial public offering (IPO) during the time period that ended about
one year prior (so as to obtain some record of post-issue stock market results
and impacts upon company management), generating 30 companies on each list.
Development of these lists was difficult as no single source of information,
including the regional office of the SEC, could reliably identify the companies.
Indeed the two primary sources on IPO activities nationally, the Investment
Dealers Digest and the IPO Reporter, disagree in their numbers over the years
by as much as forty percent, due in large part to different definitions of IPOs.
The lists used here should be reasonably reliable, given all of the
cross-checking done to assure completeness. Half of each list was included in
the actual interviews, providing detailed data on 16 and 15 firms, respectively.
The Boston and New York underwriters involved in these public issues were
also studied, producing information from 9 different investment banking firms
in each of the two analyses, occasionally from more than one office of these
firms. Data were analyzed separately for each sample as well as for the
combined set when appropriate.
What seems remarkable is the essential sameness of the findings from
the two sample sets, despite their decade plus separation. For example, even
4the spread of company interviewees turns out to be the same, although
originally the CEO of each company was approached for cooperation: 7
presidents, 7 treasurers and 2 outside Board members are the sources in the
first analysis; 8 presidents and 7 treasurers provide the data for the second
sampling. While the results are not necessarily representative of what might
be found today, or in other parts of the United States, they reflect the types of
issues, the process, and the outcomes that at least Greater Boston technical
entrepreneurs have experienced over the past twenty five years. A review of
recent IPOs with high market valuations (Venture, April 1989) indicates that
13 out of 100 came from Massachusetts, second only to California which
originated 39 of the IPOs. Those data suggest that a comparison of these
samples with California high-technology public offerings might be the most
beneficial route toward generalization.
However, this article provides no insights on technological firms that
wanted to go public but failed, a group that must be very large given the
information from the underwriters in both samples who claim that as few as 1
to 5 percent of the companies they review eventually go public. This
percentage screened out of the public market is comparable to the turndown
rate for funding by venture capitalists that has been demonstrated previously
(Roberts, 1990).
WHO GOES PUBLIC?
The previous discussion (Ibid.) of financing provides some incidental
indications of initial public offerings among young Greater Boston-area
technology-based companies. Out of one sample of 110 MIT-based companies
only 2 had gone public for their initial financing and, up to the time of the data
gathering, an additional 7 had received public funds as their means of
secondary financing while 8 went public for their tertiary-stage funding.
While others from this cluster may well have gone public at some later date,
these data suggest that not much more than fifteen percent of the total
population of technological companies went public, probably generally
indicative of the extent of public market financing of technical firms. For
perspective, venture capital firms eventually get involved as the principal
financiers of a comparable percentage of the MIT spinoff companies, some of
whom of course later go public. And non-financial corporations are key funding
sources of about twenty percent of the firms, some of which later go public but
more of which are eventually purchased outright by the non-financial
5corporations. A recent analysis by Freear & Wetzel (1990) shows that public
stock offerings account for 6.7% (30/445) of the equity rounds and 18%
(122/671) of the funds raised externally by their sample of New England
technology-based firms.
An old adage in going public is "sell the sizzle or sell the steak". Some
potential stock purchasers are perceived as likely to be attracted by the
glamour of very early-stage firms, which have great promise but are too young
to be assessed in terms of actual performance. Other potential buyers are
assumed to want to be able to evaluate actual company performance, i.e.,
products, revenues and profits, before they buy stock. As shown in Table 1 the
two "going public" samples, supported by the MIT spinoff information cited
above, indicate that technical firms tend to split 50-50 between trying to sell
"sizzle" or "steak". In contrast only 2 of 79 Japanese firms studied went public
with less than 10 years of existence. (Systems Science Institute, 1989)
Clearly those going public at the time of their founding have only promise and
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
no performance. The entrepreneurs personally may have established a prior
track record at some other firm that constitutes a "substitute" measure of
performance, but their new companies are as yet untested. The post-formation
firms selling public stock at an early stage are similarly lacking in tangible
measures of performance and are relying primarily upon "sizzle". They have no
sales or very little sales, a maximum of $453,000 in the prior year for the
largest "early issuer" in the more recent data set. The eight early-stage
issuers in the first sample all have fewer than 25 employees and average three
years old.
In contrast, the eight firms in the recent IPO study that went public at a
later stage have revenues from over one million dollars to over fifty million
dollars in the latest fiscal year prior to their public offering. Typically the
later-stage issuers have several hundred employees and an average age of
eight years. This latter group is still rapidly growing, however, showing sales
growth rates of up to several hundred percent over their previous year.
Throughout this article the company's stage of development and size are shown
to be the critical parameters that affect many aspects of the going public
process. Small/large, "sizzle"/"steak" are the differentiating elements for
technical firms going public.
III
6WHY GO PUBLIC?
All the companies in the two IPO studies have at least one factor in
common: They had decided to issue new equity to the public rather than choose
other available sources of capital such as bank loans, private placements,
venture capital or even selling the company. To the extent that the firms are
at various stages of development they have differing financing opportunities
available to them. As contrasts, a couple of the firms went public at inception
while others had long stable records of sales and earnings. The former have
the choice between going public and raising funds from the more common
private investors and venture capital companies; the latter are already much
too large to seek further venture capital. For smaller earlier stage firms the
principal issue is the likely higher cost, in terms of proportion of the company
to be given up, to raise the needed capital privately. Alternatively a number of
these younger companies worry about whether they are far enough along in
their own development to cope with the consequences of being a public
corporation. Several firms have already exhausted other sources. For example,
one company was started with founder seed capital, privately placed $300,000
of equity one year later, entered into a number of contract development
programs with customers to expand its resources further, and had already
privately placed additional securities twice before making the decision to go
public. Another early stage company sought advice from an investment banker
for sources to expand beyond the financial capacity of the original founders.
The investment banker presented the alternatives (his firm also had a venture
capital arm) and the decision was made to go public. Advice on alternatives
seems readily available, especially to the larger companies in which venture
capital funds tend to have prior investments. (p=.0 2) For example, venture
capital companies have previously invested in six of the seven largest firms in
the early IPO sample.
A majority of the larger companies have seriously considered making a
primary issue previously but have not gone through with it for various reasons.
Abandonment due to poor stock market conditions is the principal explanation
but some firms had been advised that they were too small to go public. Two of
the larger companies of the more recent IPOs had previous unsuccessful
attempts at non-underwritten "Reg A" offerings. ("Reg A"s are less formal and
smaller public issues carried out under the SEC's Regulation A provisions, and
can be underwritten or sold by the company itself without using an
7underwriter.) Those two firms proceeded this time through to an immediate
search for an investment banker "who would do it right".
When asked to rank the advantages they had perceived in advance of
going public, the entrepreneurs in the first sample responded:
1. Fill an immediate need for cash and working capital;
2. Create a public market to facilitate acquisitions;
3. Create a public market to permit sales of their own holdings;
4. Improve their firm's debt-equity ratio.
7 of the 8 smaller firms regard their capital needs as "urgent"; 11 of 15 firms
rate the need for working capital as #1, agreeing with 14 of 15 companies in
the second study. The urgency issue caused several CEOs and CFOs to laugh
when asked this question. One responded, "Our bank refused to extend our line
of credit, even at 2 1/2% above prime, and we forecast that available working
capital would be completely gone by the end of the year. A firm in a similar
business had just gone to the market at some crazy multiple. We would have
been nuts not to go public." Another CEO remarked, "Going public was not the
best alternative, it was the only way left to us to raise real high risk capital."
Others put this in perspective by saying that the public market provides the
lowest cost source of needed working capital.
Special capital-related reasons show up in both IPO samples. In one
case the public offering permitted the sale of a large fraction of stock of the
major shareholders who are relatives of the original but no longer dominant
founder. This enabled the present management to end an uncomfortable
situation of stock control by a small group of foreign owners. A second case
permitted a negotiated settlement to be paid by a spinoff from another
high-technology company that was in bankruptcy proceedings.
The larger technical companies perceive the creation of a public market
as a more important advantage than do the smaller companies (p=.001). This is
true both for the purpose of facilitating acquisitions as well as permitting the
sale of founders' stock in the after-market. (During any three months period
SEC Rule 144 allows the sale by insiders of the greater of one percent of the
class of stock outstanding or the average of the four most recent weeks'
trading volume.) The larger firms also express less need for working capital
than the smaller companies (p=.04). The desire to improve debt-equity ratio
through the significant increase in their equity base is common among firms of
all sizes, the managements recognizing that their ability to borrow funds will
8be enhanced. Half of the entrepreneurs specifically mention advantages
accruing from their customers' interests in becoming stockholders.
A comparable number of disadvantages is also perceived by the
entrepreneurs prior to deciding to go public. A major issue with some is the
direct cost of going public which is discussed in depth in "the deal" section of
this article. Some entrepreneurs in the more recent study were concerned in
advance about potential loss of control, although other entrepreneurs
specifically point out that private investors can exert a much higher degree of
control than the public. Several entrepreneurs remarked that the public
financing would effectively strengthen management's control by widely
distributing stock to more passive investors. The principal difference between
the earlier and later IPO samples is the more recent group's worries about
undue public pressures on short term results (10 of the 15 entrepreneurs) and
the somewhat related cost of managing ongoing shareholder relations,
especially in terms of key persons' time (8 out of 15). The earlier group senses
essentially no overall disadvantages of going public, expressing minimal
concerns in all these areas, with noone worried about loss of control.
Recent technological entrepreneurs who are going public may be more
sophisticated than their earlier counterparts, or there may indeed have been'a
real change in the stock analyst, regulatory and other public pressures upon the
publicly owned corporation. Not all entrepreneurs knuckle under to these
pressures. One proclaimed, "We make it very clear in all our reports that our
goal is long term growth. In the prospectus we said that no dividends would be
paid and that we did not expect to earn a profit in the next three years. As long
as we make this clear, then if our investors are so concerned about quarterly
results they can find another company!" Another remarked, perhaps more
thoughtfully, "Growing at our rate means we're going to have to issue more debt
or equity periodically to satisfy our needs. If the investment community is
unhappy with our short term results, even if we think this is nonsense, it will
affect our ability and our costs to acquire funds in the future. We have to take
this into account."
The timing of an issue is jointly determined by the companies' internal
needs for funds and the conditions of the securities markets. Overall these are
ranked comparably by the entrepreneurs in both samples, 13 or 14 in each
sample regarding each as paramount in importance. The large companies rate
market considerations as a more important factor than the small companies
(p=.002), for which capital had generally become a critical requirement. At
least twenty percent of the companies would have gone under in the absence of
an immediate public offering, since no other source of funding seemed
available to them. The small companies which had gone public during a "hot
issues" market admit after the fact that the timing of their issue was luck, but
large companies had tended to wait for favorable market conditions. One
biotechnology company admits it was awakened by the hot biotech market into
quickly developing an ambitious business plan requiring a large capital input in
order to take advantage of the market opportunity. Often the 3-6 months delay
from the beginning of preparation for going public to the final effective date of
the offering causes loss of an attractive hot market. Fortunately for it, the
biotech firm completed its public offering while the market window was still
open, enabling the company to launch an extensive program of product
development. But the company did have to suffer with lots of stockholder
discontent in the eroded stock market that soon followed.
FINDING AN UNDERWRITER
Occasionally a company decides to go public after being approached by
an underwriter who persuades the firm to issue public stock. In this case the
underwriter choice and the company's decision are concurrent events. In most
situations a technical firm needs to find an investment banker that will agree
to underwrite a public offering. This involves decision-making by two parties
-- the technological firm and the investment banking firm -- both of which
apply their own search, evaluation and decision criteria. This section first
examines the firm's efforts and then turns attention to the underwriter.
In the first sample three of the five smallest companies, all of which
were still developing their first products, did not seriously attempt to find an
underwriter. They considered it a hopeless task since they were so small and
risky and decided to prepare and sell their own small "Reg A" issues of stock.
Two others in this sample failed to find a satisfactory underwriting deal and
also went the Reg A route on their own. All the rest of the first group and all
but one of the second sample of companies were fully underwritten.
The Technological Firm's Search and Decision
The legal, financial and organizational intricacies of going public are
complex and not well understood by many others than those professionals who
Ill
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are directly engaged in these activities. The need for help becomes apparent
quickly to anyone contemplating a public offering. Entrepreneurs of the
smaller companies rely on a diverse group of professional people for guidance,
including accountants, lawyers, bankers and personal friends. Two of these
companies were advised by members of their Boards who eventually managed
the offerings which were made directly to the public. The larger companies
rely heavily on the outsiders on their boards for advice, especially in the many
cases in which venture capital investors are on the boards. After extensive
consultation with its advisors, one entrepreneur felt so helpless that he
reported, "i was willing to let anyone underwrite the issue." The other
entrepreneurs communicate more definite criteria to evaluate possible
underwriters.
In the first sample three factors emerge prominently. Most important
is a preference for an established investment banking firm that had built a
good reputation. The larger the technical firm the more important is this
reputation criterion (.04). Second is the importance of national distribution,
this capability also being weighed significantly more heavily by the larger
companies (.05). Finally, in each sample several of the entrepreneurs prefer
underwriters who specialized in or had extensive experience with
technology-based issues. Interestingly, the smaller firms tend to see this
criterion as more important. In describing the ideal investment banker the
more recent sample of entrepreneurs agree on the desirability of the large
national firm or the old established firm with good reputation. These
entrepreneurs support the concern for gaining a wide distribution, but more
strongly emphasize the desire for smooth working relationships, as well as for
an investment banker with an ability to maintain an after-market for the
company's stock.
While the larger companies carefully seek out underwriting houses
which meet their concerns, the smaller companies are far less sophisticated,
approaching investment banking firms more or less at random. Among the eight
smaller companies in the early IPOs two did not bother to approach any
underwriter while at the opposite extreme two presented formal proposals to
more than five firms. The larger companies are often more selective, in part
due to the presence of a venture capitalist or banker on their boards or due to
dealings with an investment banker in regard to earlier private placements.
Two in the early sample set and eight in the later group approached only one
investment banker each and secured its services. A number of the companies
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report that they had engaged in negotiations with two underwriters
simultaneously, and several entrepreneurs made contacts with three or more
underwriters. One large company discussed its proposed offering with eight
special and major bracket underwriters who all seemed eager to perform
underwriting services. The company was in the pleasant position of not
needing to go public and believed that competition among the underwriters
would encourage each to outperform the others, both on the IPO and on any
future transactions.
Three of the smaller companies in the first group obtained an
underwriter after a long and discouraging search. They were continually
refused due to their small size and lack of earnings. Each of them ultimately
found an underwriter after enlisting the services of a "finder". The larger
companies in that sample and all of those in the later cluster were more
successful in attracting proposals from underwriters. Most of the enterprises
which talked to more than one underwriter received more than one proposal,
leaving final choices to be made that turned out to be quite subjective.
Ultimately, the interviews suggest that each company's decision is closely tied
to its objectives in making a public issue. As in many grey areas of business
the entrepreneurs have trouble justifying their decisions on rational grounds.
The Underwriter's Perspective
Detailed structured interviews with the 18 investment banking firms in
the two samples generate perspectives on the process followed in deciding to
underwrite. These firms vary considerably by size (regional versus national),
reputation (old established versus new), specialization (full line services
versus technology specialist), and attitudes toward IPOs as a business in
general. These differences cause few conclusions of general validity. One
clear generalization is that especially in times of "new issues" markets
underwriters are besieged by opportunities. They then need to be very
selective in matching their own capacities to the potential deals they see.
Even in less hectic periods only a small fraction of companies wanting to go
public are given underwriting. The principal sources of referrals to these
investment banking firms are, in descending order, friends, current clients, and
venture capitalists. Direct approaches by entrepreneurs do result in some
underwriting but are seen by the underwriting firms as far less important
overall because of the lack of prior screening.
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Although hundreds of underwriters exist in the United States (and many
more servicing new opportunities not included in this study for going public in
overseas markets), the market is clearly dominated by a few specialist firms
for which the IPO is a major source of income. At least one firm in the sample
has IPOs accounting for over 75% of its total revenue. For another full service
investment banker in the sample, IPOs might produce only 5-10% of its
revenues. All the underwriters interviewed find IPOs profitable. Naturally
those specializing in initial public offerings are generally more active in
directly marketing themselves to potential IPO candidates, but in recent years
most of the national firms have set up technology groups specifically aimed at
attracting and servicing these smaller companies. Each underwriter has its
own general and specific criteria for agreeing to underwrite a company. But
their testimony in the interviews, evidenced by their documented practice as
well, indicates that these criteria may be ignored if the company looks
exceptionally "good".
In choosing to underwrite an issue the firm must balance its own
perceptions of the key factors determining the strength of a company and the
characteristics that they feel investors view as most important. Ultimately
the underwriter is an intermediary between the investor and the issuer.
Therefore, the underwriter must be concerned with the marketability of a given
security. If the underwriter feels that the market is currently responsive to
service industry issues (e.g., restaurant chains), it will select these. If, on the
other hand, technology issues seem "hot" and are expected to continue to be, the
underwriter may select companies within this industry cluster. With industry
choice determined by the market the underwriter then looks for individual
companies within the favored industries which satisfy its taste and judgment.
Table 2 tabulates the number of underwriters who view particular
company characteristics as most important to stock buying customers, based
on those included in the more recent sample. Sound company management
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
and future growth prospects are the most frequently cited very important
factors. The earlier data show the same ordered priorities toward the
capabilities and depth of management, the future growth prospects of the firm
and its industry, and the past record of the company. This agreement upon the
importance of company management is not surprising yet investors rarely have
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the opportunity to meet management prior to buying the securities. As few
investors read beyond the summary and first pages of a prospectus, the
investors ultimately depend upon the underwriters' evaluation of
management, implicit presumably in the decision to underwrite. Despite the
claimed relative importance of historical earnings, many of the companies
studied have little or no previous earnings (including seven in each of the two
samples), several expecting none for at least a few years. This is an example
of a criterion which many underwriters are obviously willing to forgive for the
"hot" prospect, even though they feel it is very important.
Whether only a rationalization of the opinions expressed in Table 2 or
not, it is comforting to note in Table 3 that assessment of weak
management, in addition to weak market conditions, are the key reasons cited
by underwriters for rejecting a company. Beyond these general selection
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
criteria most underwriters also have specific rules of thumb used in their
evaluations. Minimum size of the company, and minimum (for the smaller
underwriters, also maximum) size of the stock offering are among the scoping
criteria applied by underwriters to screen initial interest in the potential
underwriting.
Eleven of the sixteen technological companies in the sample of early
IPOs and all but one of the later sample ended up with full commitment
underwritings. The smaller firms often seemed lucky to get one underwriter,
the larger companies usually got to choose. The larger companies all obtained
the services of reputable investment bankers including a few of the most
prestigious firms in the industry. Investment bankers for the entire sample
range from the lesser lights of the industry up to Paine Webber and Alex Brown.
All of the investment bankers violate their own stated guidelines regarding the
minimum size of companies, some of the situations not even coming close.
Despite this the size of the technical company and the size of the investment
banker are highly correlated (.001), indicating primarily the preferences of the
larger investment bankers.
THE DEAL
While the initial proposals of both the companies and the underwriters
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outline the general terms of an issue, the two parties must negotiate the exact
terms of the deal as it will be offered to the public. Key areas of negotiation
include the market value of the technical firm, the percentage of the company
to be offered, the price per share and the underwriter's compensation. Other
less prominent issues also need to be resolved, such as secondary shares,
warrants, board seats and rights of first refusal on subsequent offerings.
Overall both the entrepreneurs and the underwriters report that these
negotiations are relatively harmonious based on trust, respect and the general
feeling that neither side tries to gain the upper hand. A few of the
entrepreneurs report extensive hard bargaining in which they felt themselves
at a disadvantage due to their inability to find another investment banker. Yet
only one entrepreneur believes that the underwriter and deteriorating market
conditions placed him in a position of doing a deal on terms with which he was
less than comfortable. For non-underwritten issues the company's officers and
advisors unilaterally set the terms.
After futile searches for an underwriter five of the companies in the
earlier sample decided to offer their issues directly to the public, without an
underwriter. All of these were small Reg A issues, offered by companies that
were new, small, unprofitable and undercapitalized. The size of the offerings
were set to meet the projected capital needs of these companies. One firm
nominally sought twice the amount it needed because its management assumed
they would only be able to sell about half the issue! Prices were set on a
subjective basis with three of the companies choosing $10.00 per share
because they thought that price would convey a good image to the public.
Despite their companies' real condition as seed-stage firms, the entrepreneurs
didn't want to create the impression that they were "penny stocks"!
Company Valuation
In the underwritten cases joint decisionmaking, rather than negotiation,
is a better way to describe the process for establishing company valuation.
Stated differences of opinion with few exceptions range only up to twenty
percent. For instance, eight entrepreneurs say they entered the discussions
with a firm idea of the market value of their own company, based largely on
their analyses of market valuation of similar companies. In only one case was
the company eventually valued lower than management's initial assessment.
The companies with no earnings generally left the valuation up to the
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underwriter. Textbook solutions call for projections of a company's future
earnings and payouts, accounting for all associated taxes, discounting the yield
back to the present based on a market interest rate that reflects the riskiness
of the investment. Needless to say no underwriter indicates it adopts the
textbook approach to valuation. One development stage company studied, with
no earnings but with sophisticated management, utilized the underwriter
search process as a mechanism for evaluating itself. It garnered five offers
from financial sources which helped establish an envelope for company
valuation in its public offering. The management and underwriter of another
development stage company for which there is no public market industry
equivalent patterned its public offering, in terms of dollars raised for a given
percentage of the company, on a basis comparable to what a private venture
capital transaction would cost. Thus a valuation was simply transferred
between financial market segments.
For companies with a record of earnings, especially the more
established firms, the underwriters tend loosely to apply price-earnings (P/E)
ratios of "similar" firms to reflect current market conditions. Table 4 lists
the offering P/E ratios for the companies that have earnings, assuming full
dilution based on the stock being sold. The more recently issued stocks have
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
lower P/E ratios overall, but a wide variation of a 5 to 1 range is reflected in
both samples. Statistical tests find little correlation between these ratios
and the size of the companies as measured by sales, total assets or net worth.
Nor are they correlated with sales growth rates. The most cogent explanation
is that the spread in the P/E ratios shows the effects of industry fads, special
circumstances of the companies and different timing relative to "hot" markets.
The issue of glamour of a particular industry adds considerable volatility to
the pricing of IPOs. Security analysts told the manager of one biotechnology
company that it was too bad his company had earnings, because now everyone
would attach a P/E ratio to his income stream. The analysts presume that due
to market "hype" the company might have received a higher valuation without
any earnings. As a further statement of the quandary surrounding the pricing of
new issues the Price/Revenues ratios are also calculated for these firms and
show a range of from 1.2 to 4.8, not correlated with the P/E ratios nor with any
other other performance measure. Examining a large number of IPOs issued
during 1978-85, McBain & Krause (1989) find that the P/E ratio is directly
III
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related to the percentage of the firm's equity retained by the insiders.
Price and Proceeds
The offering prices themselves for the underwritten companies range
from $0.50 per share in two cases up to $22.00 per share, with a median price
of $9.50. The offering price most highly correlates with the total proceeds of
the primary issue (R 2=.70, p=.01), and also correlates with factors related to
the size of the company, including net worth, total assets and revenues. The
firm's revenues as a single variable explain 63 percent of the variance in the
offering price (.005). A multi-variate analysis does not significantly improve
the model. Also, since the larger investment banking firms underwrite the
larger issues, the size of the investment banking firm is positively rank
correlated with the offering price (.002).
As expected the total proceeds from the public offering highly correlate
with the size of the company. A linear regression model with net worth and
revenues as independent variables explains 96 percent of the variance in the
total proceeds (.005). The size of the issue highly relates to the size of the
underwriter (.02), indicating that the larger the investment banker the larger
the total proceeds of the issues underwritten. Total proceeds equals price per
share times number of shares. Since both the proceeds and the price correlate
with aspects of company size, it is not too surprising to discover that the
number of shares issued also positively relates with the total assets of the
company (R 2=.79, p=.005) and is rank correlated with the size of the
underwriter (.002). The proportion of the company offered to the public is not
highly related either to the size of the company or its growth rate.
In eight of the 31 cases companies had combined offerings comprised of
new shares and the registration and sale of some insider shares, called
"secondary shares". Underwriters monitor this process closely to avoid the
appearance that owner/managers are bailing out. Half of these cases involve
primarily non-management shareholders desiring to achieve some liquidity. In
the other four cases the company's own cash needs are modest and the
investment banker felt that sale of additional shares was necessary to make
the size of the issue large enough. In these latter circumstances the majority
of the pre-issue stockholders are somewhat reluctant to offer their stock as
part of the primary issue since they anticipate being able to sell at a much
higher price in the after-market. In three cases insiders finally agreed to sell
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an equal "taxed" proportion of their holdings, feeling mollified by the fact that
all shareholders were being treated uniformly.
Underwriter Compensation
Many entrepreneurs find the underwriter's discount and commissions
and the total accounting, legal and underwriting expenses quite high relative to
their prior expectations. However these issuing costs are not heavily
negotiated at the outset. The underwriter's discount or spread (the difference
between the offering price and the net proceeds to the company) is the
underwriter's main source of compensation for all of the deals and the sole
source of compensation for the nine largest issues (no warrants on them). The
spread, expressed as a percentage of the offering price, varies from a low of
6.0% to a high of 18.4%. Table 5 shows not surprisingly that in the fourteen
years between the two samplings the underwriter's spread as a percent of total
proceeds grew about 10 percent (as measured by the median) while the total
expenses increased about 40 percent. The spread is negatively correlated with
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE
the price of the stock (R 2=.72, p=.005), indicating a higher spread for the lower
priced offerings. Since the price of the stock supposedly reflects the quality
and riskiness of the issue, the underwriter is expected by financial theorists
to demand higher compensation for assuming the risk inherent in a low priced
offering. By widening its spread on the more risky issues the underwriter
provides itself with greater margin to be able to sell off its inventory of
company stock if the security meets with a poor reception on the offering date.
The same outcome of higher spread for the smaller issues also results if one
believes that the underwriter is merely allotting its fixed costs of service
over a small base. As another measure of the same phenomenon, when the two
samples of IPOs are each split at their medians by asset size (as listed in
Table 5), the smaller companies are found to have incurred a significantly
higher mean spread of 10.6 percent (10.9 in the more recent group) versus only
7.2 percent in the larger companies (9.9 for the recent IPOs).
Multivariate analysis reveals only one other factor that helps explain
the variance of the spread. The linear combination of issue price and the year
of issue explains 82 percent of the variance, with the spread negatively
correlated with both factors. This indicates that the spread tends to be less
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during "new issues" markets than for a similarly priced stock issued at some
other time. Practically, the underwriter's own cost of selling no doubt
decreases when investor demand is high. This is also theoretically reasonable
since the underwriter's risk presumably declines when investors' demand for
primary stocks increases.
In addition to the underwriters spread, the company must pay the other
direct costs associated with the offering, including fees for lawyers and
accountants, printing costs, and other direct costs incurred by the underwriter
in connection with the issue. The rapid increase of these costs in recent years,
partially to pay for new selling costs such as "road shows" and color inserts in
the prospectus, partially to pay for significantly increased legal scrutiny,
makes the "other costs" a large add-on to the underwriter's base commission.
These "other costs" are especially significant in the two underwritten
Regulation A issues in the earlier sample ( in Table 5), where they represent
18.9 and 16.7 percent of the total proceeds. There is little reason to believe
that the real direct costs should be so high for these small issues. It is
possible that these two companies, in urgent need of funds, were charged
unreasonably for the services rendered by others in connection with the issue.
The median and mean costs shown in Table 5 are recalculated (+), omitting
those two special cases, to provide a possibly more representative cost
picture.
The resulting total costs of the issue by company are also presented in
Table 5, indicating that the underwriter's spread is the major component of the
total cost for all but a few cases. Multivariate regression analysis shows that
the linear combination of the issue price and the total assets explains 89
percent of the variance in the total percentage direct costs (.10), both
independent variables being negatively correlated with the percentage costs.
The year of issue does not have a statistically significant effect here. Thus
the smaller companies, or those with low issue price, experience much higher
direct costs. Splitting the two samples again at their medians by asset size
confirms the effect of company size on the total cost of going public. The
smaller companies, including the two Reg As, incur a significantly higher mean
total cost of 22.0 percent (17.4 % in the more recent IPOs) while the larger
firms average only 9.6 percent (12.6 % in the recent sample). The same
statistically significant result is found when the firms are divided into
clusters in accord with their previous year's sales, i.e. the smaller
technological companies pay considerably more proportionately than the large
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to generate their public funds.
A matching of total costs against underwriters shows that the most
prestigious underwriters engage in the larger transactions with lower issuing
costs, while the less prestigious and "best efforts" financiers with smaller
transactions have comparatively higher expenses. These may alternatively
reveal the prestigious underwriters as being more cost competitive or, perhaps
more likely, the smaller technical firms as having less bargaining power. Then
again, some entrepreneurs do not regard these "total costs" as costs at all,
because they are not reflected in their own company's income statements!
A final important compensation are the warrants that are sold to the
underwriter at a nominal charge. These are required by the underwriters of the
smaller issues, requested by some other underwriters but not by those doing
the largest underwritings. The six largest underwritings in the early IPO
sample and the three largest more recently do not include warrants for the
underwriter; all but one of the remaining underwritten issues contain
warrants. In most cases the warrants are for 10 percent of the number of total
shares offered in the primary issue, although the sample does include one firm
with only 2% warrant coverage and several with up to 20 percent. The prices
at which the warrants can be exercised in the future range from the offering
price itself in most situations, to 120% of the offering price in one case, to
another deal that provides for a 10% per year escalation over the offering price
during the next five years. In general the warrants are not exercisable for a
year but their life lasts as long as five years. While it is very difficult to
attach a monetary cost to the warrants, it is sufficient to note that here too
the largest technical firms do not incur this cost as part of their going public
episode.
Board representation by the underwriters, rights of first refusal on
subsequent offerings, and even consulting services are the remaining terms and
conditions negotiated. About one-third of the sampled companies elected a
new board member from the underwriter, contingent upon the offering, while
several had pre-existing board members from those firms, sometimes due to
prior venture capital investments. The smaller underwriters sometimes
negotiate a right of first refusal and consulting fees. The weaker companies in
the sample, whose horizons are dark without the public monies, are hardly in a
position to negotiate vigorously these minor issues or indeed may believe that
the ongoing outsider presence is beneficial. Larger investment banking firms
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not only do not require board membership, but often decline invitations to
serve except in unusually attractive companies. Similarly, the larger
underwriters rarely argue for a clause in their contracts to guarantee future
underwritings, presuming that their performance and position will generally
suffice for assuring future business.
OUTCOMES
Pre-issue Activities
Concluding a deal is only the beginning of "the rest of the story", as Paul
Harvey says. Much work is now needed to "clean up" the company, prepare the
prospectus and gain SEC approval, and market the stock to prospective
investors, before the new issue can become effective. In the firms in both
samples employment agreements with key employees are often revised to
provide assurances demanded by the underwriter. Recapitalization of the
company's stock frequently occurs, with stock splits or consolidations to
generate the right number of shares desired for pricing considerations.
Liquidations of product lines, rewriting agreements among stockholders and
persuading debtors to alter their terms are common pre-issue requirements.
More subtle changes also take place in preparation for the public
offering. Many companies restructure their boards of directors to include
outsiders and individuals with expertise missing from top management. A
substantial number change law firms and/or accountants as part of image
projection, while also bringing in more expertise for the public offering. Some
spinoff firms need to project better arms-length relationships with their
original parent, some enter licensing agreements to ward off fears of possible
law suits, and others tie down formal relationships with outside customers or
key suppliers. A number of the larger firms which have for years been waiting
for the right opportunity to go public, already had formally audited financials,
prestigious outside directors, and disclosures prepared even when not required.
Several other companies have earlier entered into joint development contracts
specifically to bring a large and respected company into a financial
relationship prior to going public. Another firm entered into a marketing
agreement with alarge overseas partner to "clean up our balance sheet". These
types of changes by the early stage companies are obviously more limited due
to time constraints and lack of prior planning to go public. Pre-issue cleanup
is widely practiced by Japanese firms as well, beginning deliberately several
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years before the planned public offering. (Systems Science Institute, 1989)
Preparation of the prospectus, in close working relationships with the
underwriters and lawyers, consumes much management time. The SEC has
specific disclosure guidelines about securities, and rules controlling undue
promotional activities by management around the offering date. The
prospectus tells part of the company's story, but is usually highly stylized and
replete with caveats insisted upon by the SEC and by the company's and the
underwriter's counsel. The prospectus cannot contain any forecasts but only a
bland and boilerplate section entitled "use of proceeds", which may mention
working capital requirements, the intent to retire debt, or funding for a new
product generation, hardly enough information to project a vision of the future.
Historical earnings are not always helpful because as shown earlier a large
fraction of the technological firms going public have little or no past earnings.
There is seldom opportunity to "sell" within the prospectus except in very
subtle ways. In the more recent sample one third of the prospecti have color
pictures of company products and even fold out presentations to improve
communication and image.
The conservatism embodied in these prospecti is reflected in the fact
that none of the companies encountered any really serious problems with the
SEC during the registration process. The entrepreneurs attribute their success
to their lawyers and accounting firms as well as to the expertise of the
investment bankers in preparing the registration statement and prospectus.
Ironically, although the Reg A filing is intended to simplify going public for a
small issue of stock, those few smaller firms which used the Reg A were also
more likely to lack expert legal advice. Consequently two of the
non-underwritten companies required more than six months to gain SEC
approval after submitting their initial statements, in contrast to the typical
delay of two to three months encountered for the full preparation and SEC
approval of the more complex filings. Only one firm got into trouble with the
"blue sky" commissions of the various states in which the offerings were
registered. In this case the commission ultimately limited the price of the
issue by constraining, to 25:1 (!!), the price-earnings ratio of the offering.
Since a major stockholder of the company resided in that state it was
necessary to obtain the commission's approval. Much to the chagrin of the
company and its underwriter, the issue was forced to be priced substantially
below their intended level. It later became one of the "hot" stocks of the year.
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The "road show" is often the mechanism for selling. Not all
underwriters organize this effort, but several entrepreneurs made
presentations about their companies around the country, occasionally also
overseas in Europe and Japan. The entrepreneur's own salesmanship talents are
put to use in promoting the company's securities at meetings in major cities of
local brokers, their clients and institutional investors. Management is usually
rehearsed by the underwriters and legal counsel to assure that statements and
responses to questions are within SEC guidelines. One underwriter, summing
up the importance of the road show in convincing prospective buyers, exclaimed
"No story, no deal." One entrepreneur describes with glee his zealous
underwriter, who videotaped management's discussion and demonstration of
company products and then flew a private jet around the country stirring up
investor interest. These methods do provide for some potential investors, or at
least their stock brokers, a chance to see and hear the company president in
advance of the offering, perhaps satisfying their investment concerns for sound
management that are highlighted in Table 2.
In organizing to move the stock the underwriter creates a distribution
network of retail and institutional brokers. The underwriting syndicates range
from a single firm, carrying out a "best efforts" underwriting, to a full
commitment co-managed transaction which includes 83 underwriters. The
median number of underwriters in the recent IPOs is 33. As expected the
larger dollar volume transactions have the larger number of underwriters.
Prior to setting the final price the syndicate may accept "indications of
interest" from potential purchasers, in theory to help the underwriter
determine how it should set the final price. Actually the underwriter usually
tells prospects that the price has been set at close to a certain level and asks
how many shares the prospect would like if it is possible to get that number.
If demand exceeds supply, the underwriters allocate their shares to their
customers as they choose. Should supply and demand be out of balance by
several orders of magnitude, the offering price may be changed, but rarely is
there an iterative process in an attempt to find a market equilibrium. In only
one case in the samples was there a last minute significant decrease in both
the offering price and the number of shares offered by the underwriter,
upsetting the entrepreneur who felt trapped into a more costly and less
beneficial underwriting.
Sales of the Issues
-'
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The underwritten issues were sold in their entirety on the effective
date of the offering. The five non-underwritten Reg A issues among the earlier
IPOs were slow to sell, Figure 1 showing the sales records of the four which
only sold part of their intended offerings. Only one of those firms placed its
entire issue, and then only after a seven months selling effort. Three
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
non-underwritten companies suspended their issues within one year of the
effective date without completing the offering. One of these stopped after
receiving 55 percent of the proposed total proceeds, the same firm mentioned
earlier that had set its stated proceeds for the issue at twice its estimated
requirements. A second firm's stockholders voted to suspend stock sales when
75 percent of its initial target was reached. Since amendments to the filing
notice and offering circular have to be filed with the SEC after one year, a
third firm suspended its offering at that point, with 75 percent of its issue
sold. The fourth company that did not sell its entire issue did file the required
amendments and continued to sell stock for a total of eighteen months, when it
too finally gave up at the 75 percent completion level.
Stock distribution varies enormously across the issues. The large
underwriters tend to distribute the stock far more widely as evidenced by the
average shares held by an individual (p=.04). Again the non-underwritten
cases stand out as perhaps unfortunate exceptions. In three situations the
entrepreneurs managed the offerings personally, selling stock to friends,
relatives, business acquaintances and professional contacts. Initial sales
often generated a chain reaction: Individuals who bought a stock recommended
it to their friends who contacted the company and bought shares. One issue,
managed by an influential member of the company's board, was placed almost
entirely with doctors and other professionals in Alabama.
After-Market Performance
An after-market for trading cannot develop while the company is still
offering the stock at the issue price. Consequently no trading occurs in any of
the non-underwritten issues until well after the companies suspend their
selling efforts. And even then a rather inactive trading market has developed
for only two of those five companies, prior to later refinancing activities of
some of the firms.
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In contrast markets and trading started immediately for all the
underwritten issues in both samples, the prices at first day's closing ranging
from 11 percent below the offering price to 181 percent above it, as shown in
Table 6. The gains on offering day for the earlier set of underwritten IPOs are
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE
significantly greater than those that went public more recently. An
unanticipated positive side effect on employee morale and esprit de corps
often results. At one company employees were dancing and singing in the halls
as the stock price more than doubled on the effective date of the issue.
Bivariate regression analyses of the first-day price appreciation with
several variables related to the issues reveal two significant relationships.
The size of the company as measured by its total assets positively correlates
with the percentage price appreciation (R 2=.33, p=.10), indicating that larger
companies escalate more on opening day than smaller firms. First-day price
change correlates as well with a dummy variable for the year of the offering
(R 2=.27, p=.10), indicating that issues made during a hot "new issues" market
tend to appreciate more than those made outside this time period. Neither the
size of the underwriting firm, the sales growth rate of the company, nor the
price-earnings ratio at the offering price relates significantly with the
first-day price change. Several multivariate linear models were also tested,
the strongest result (R 2=.46, p=.1 0) occurring for the combination of the two
individual variables highlighted above, the total company assets and the year of
going public. None of the other multivariate models tested gives statistically
significant findings.
Analyses of the stock price data after ten trading days, after one month,
after 40 trading days, and after three months show an increasing spread of the
results over time. Some of the companies continue to decline from their initial
prices, the biggest drop after 40 trading days being 32 percent. Other firms
continue to escalate in price, the largest after 40 days being 313 percent above
the initial offering price, with the mean change in the more recent set of IPOs
being +53%. In contrast the range of the NASDAQ Index during the 40 trading
days following each of these initial offerings ranges only from -6% to +16%,
with a mean range of +5%, showing the far greater volatility of the new stocks.
No easy way exists to evaluate the risk of these IPO securities although risk is
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certainly greater for them than for the market composite. But to outperform
the changes in market average by a factor of 10 seems remarkable. Sales
growth rate of the company prior to going public shows up as statistically
related to price growth of the stock in these slightly longer period market
studies. A perhaps negative short term effect on company efficiency is an
unexpected by-product of the stock price volatility. As one entrepreneur
comments, "I couldn't get an outside telephone line for about a month after the
issue. Everyone was calling his broker to get the latest price!"
Perhaps the most important observation about the stock price is that
the general increase over the offering price is sustained over these longer but
still early periods of stock trading (i.e., up to three months post-issue), clearly
indicating that these technology-based company IPOs are not overpriced. When
questioned in this regard, many of the underwriters indicate they believe in
"leaving something on the table" for the market investors. Somewhat
surprisingly the entrepreneurs do not often object to this strong suggestion
that their companies might have raised as much as twenty to fifty percent
more funds by a higher offering price. All the companies have experienced
some periods of selloff in their stock prices since their offering and
entrepreneurs often seem relieved that they went public at what both before
and after the fact seem like reasonable valuations. The principal exception is
the entrepreneur whose offering price had been limited by the state blue sky
commission. The others feel that they received a good price for their stock and
do not begrudge the public its profits. Of course, the entrepreneurs' own
considerable stockholdings have also gone up in value. Clearly related is the
observation that the price-earnings ratio at offering does not show up as
statistically significant in any of the after-market regression analyses.
Effects of Public Ownership
Despite the concerns raised by many of the entrepreneurs prior to going
public, few of them think that public ownership now has an important effect on
the way they run their businesses. Only three of them remarked that it has
affected their long range growth goals, one commenting that his firm has to
grow faster now to justify the "inflated" stock price. The other two in
contrast say they have to be more conservative and cautious in making
strategic decisions. The majority of the entrepreneurs claim that they are not
doing anything now that they would not have done had they remained a privately
held corporation. In terms of operations several CEOs affirm that they do feel
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short term pressures to accommodate investors, but one entrepreneur calls
this process a forced focus rather than a planning and operating constraint.
Several observe that managements had better pay attention to their business
rather than to their stock prices, one speaking for this group in proclaiming,
"My goal is to make money for the company, ant that is what the stockholders'
goal should be too."
The investment banking firms are now represented on the majority of
boards of directors of the companies, with all of the entrepreneurs reporting
that this relationship is beneficial and that the underwriters advice is
welcome. The investment banker does have the opportunity to influence the
long range goals of the company, but the entrepreneurs typically feel that he
has little real knowledge of or influence upon the internal operations of their
companies.
All the entrepreneurs agree that being public has added significantly to
their companies' accounting, legal and public relations expenses, especially due
to the quarterly SEC filing requirements. Many of the companies have added a
Public Relations or Investor Relations director as a result, while some have
incorporated these new responsibilities into the expanded job of the Treasurer.
The CEOs report many more phone calls from investors, investment analysts
and the news media due to their public status, but most treat the annoyance as
only at the "noise" level and not a significant interference. The positive side of
this is increased name recognition with prospective suppliers and customers,
salesmen in several firms being well received by some who previously would
not talk to them. Indeed none of the entrepreneurs regrets his decision to go
public, usually appraising the realized advantages as the same as the
entrepreneur had perceived before going public. Officers of the three smallest
underwritten companies do feel that they had gone public prematurely, leading
to high costs relative to the funds raised.
In the small group of non-underwritten entrepreneurs, two now think
they should have made a private placement instead of a public issue, believing
they should have waited until their firms were bigger and with a better track
record before going public. Two others think they should have worked harder to
find an underwriter for their issue. Surprisingly, despite their lack of success
in selling their issues, as documented in Figure 1, these entrepreneurs also do
not regret having gone public.
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Both large and small company entrepreneurs now think the most
important advantage of being a public company is increased access to
additional capital. They anticipate, and some have already realized, that future
public issues and bank borrowings will be much easier now that they are
publicly held.
The second key advantage is enhanced ability to make acquisitions, with
a small number of the firms having already made non-cash acquisitions since
their primary public stock issues. While these acquisitions would not have
been impossible before going public, the entrepreneurs attest that being a
publicly held concern facilitates negotiations. The larger companies rank the
advantage of a public market for help in their acquisitions higher than do the
small companies (.001), no doubt because the smaller firms are still more
internally oriented in their product and business development strategies.
Two other after-market advantages are considered important by many
entrepreneurs, again ranked higher by the larger technical enterprises (.07).
The creation of a public market both enables them to sell small parts of their
equity holdings and also increases the value of their employees' stock options.
In this regard it should be noted that the vast majority of the technical
entrepreneurs who have gone public are multi-millionaires today, at least on
paper. Included in the samples are two different entrepreneurs each with
market worth of several hundred million dollars. While it might be difficult
for many entrepreneurs to realize the current paper value of their holdings if
they try to liquidate their entire positions through sale of stock in the market,
the market value is gradually being turned into "cashed in" wealth by most of
the entrepreneurs. Furthermore, the market value sets a public price for
beginning negotiations toward being acquired by still larger firms, the outcome
that eventually occurs for many of these technology-based companies.
SUMMARY: "SIZZLE OR STEAK" ?
The initial observation in this article that technology-based firms can
sell the sizzle or the steak is borne out in the evidences introduced throughout
the analyses of the two samples. Whether recently or fourteen years earlier,
technical firms that go public have a wide array of different motives and
different consequences, depending significantly upon their stage of
development at the time of public offering. The data show that technical firms
III
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that go public split about 50-50 between early stage and later, the half selling
sizzle only going public at founding or typically within their first three years
of existence, with fewer than 25 employees and at best a few hundred thousand
dollars in sales. Those which are "selling the steak" are much older, averaging
eight years, have several hundred employees, and sales revenues from 1 to 50
million dollars.
Table 7 lists the statistically significant benefits accruing more to the
larger firms (compared with their smaller counterparts) in the two samples, as
enumerated in the article, clearly one-sided in supporting the gains from
waiting for the further growth to be achieved. The larger companies are better
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE
prepared for and in greater control of their decisions to go public. They more
carefully search for and find higher quality underwriters. Their deals cost
them less in direct and total costs, as well as in warrant dilution of their
stock. Their stock sales go smoothly and they even gain surprisingly in
immediate after-market price appreciation, although this differential benefit
is not sustained over the smaller companies. After the fact they feel that they
had also benefited more in regard to acquisitions, personal entrepreneurial
liquidity and employee perqs.
But if the principal purpose of going public is to raise needed capital,
then both large and small firms meet their goals. And neither group
feels it has incurred meaningful disadvantages in the process. What is not
measured in the formal data collection presented in this article is the impact
of going public on survivability of the firms. Here, in contrast, the clear
advantage is gained by the smaller companies, many of which in their own
founders' judgments would have gone under had the public offering not
succeeded. For the smaller companies going public by itself is not equivalent'
to success; rather it is a crucial step enabling their process of building a
technological enterprise to continue.
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Stage of I
Initial Stai
Table 1. Stage of Development for Technical Companies Go
MIT Spinoffs Early IPOs
Development % 
oe Financing 2 12 1 6
Early Stage, but secondary
financing
Later Stage, tertiary or
later financing
Totals
7 41
17
7 44
47
100 16
50
100
inc Public
Recent IPOs
1 7
6 40
15
53
100
II
30
Table 2. Underwriters' Views of Factors Most Important
to Customers Buying Shares in an IPO (n=10 underwriters)
Not Moderately Most
Criterion Important Important Imortant
Historical sales growth rate 1 7 2
Historical earnings per share 0 6 4
Sound company management 0 2 8
Future growth prospects 0 0 10
Size of company 5 4 1
Technological glamour 0 7 3
Price-Earnings ratio 0 8 2
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Table 3. Primary Reasons for Not Underwriting an IPO Candidate (n=10)
Not Moderately Most
Criterion Important Important Important
Market conditions (timing) 1 2 7
Weak management 1 2 7
Weak earnings 1 4 5
Premature 1 5 4
No agreement on terms 6 3 1
Company found other sources
of financing 9 1 0
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Table 4. Fully-Diluted Price-Earnings
Early IPOs
18
21
23
30
30
40
42
90
Ratios for Underwritten Offerinos
Recent IPOs
12
13
14
19
37
43
67
__
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Table 5. Total Costs of Underwritten Issues (Excluding Warrants)
(% of total proceeds) (Companies rank ordered by increasing assets.)
Early IPOs
Underwriter's Total
Discount % Costs %
12.5 31.4
10.0 26.7
9.0 18.7
12.5 19.9
9.0 13.2
7.7 10.8
6.7 10.4
7.3 9.9
8.1 9.7
7.0 8.6
6.4 8.0
Medians
Means
8.1 (7.7 +)
8.7 (8.2 +)
Recent
Underwriter's
Discount %
10.0
10.0
18.4
10.0
10.0
7.5
10.0
9.0
14.0
8.5
7.2
6.1
6.0
7.2
7.3
10.8 (10.4 +)
15.2 (12.1 +)
9.0
9.0
indicates the two underwritten Reg A issues
+ indicates the medians and means omitting the two Reg As
IPOs
Total
Costs %
14.0
14.8
25.5
18.8
14.8
15.9
18.3
15.9
21.2
12.1
8.6
15.4
8.2
10.1
8.7
14.8
14.8
I
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Table 6. % Chanqe from the Offering Price at First Day's Closing
Early IPOs
8
8
26
33
33
35
50
51
127
139
181
63
35
Mean
Median
Recent IPOs
(11)
(5)
(4)
0
0
4
6
10
12
12
36
100
100
20
6
IIIl
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Table 7. Differences in Advantages to the Larger Technological Firms that Went Public
Why Go Public ?
Advice on alternatives readily available; prior investments in larger firms by venture funds
Perceive public market as a greater advantage, for both acquisitions and sales of founder stock
Rate market considerations as more important factor in timing the offering
Have far less working capital urgency for going public
Finding the Underwriter
All seek and find underwriters; some smaller firms have to do direct non-underwritten Reg A
deals
Prefer underwriters with good reputations, as well as national distribution capabilities
The Deal
Larger companies have higher offering prices
Larger number of shares issued and higher total proceeds gained
Much lower underwriter spread for larger companies, as well as for the higher priced stocks
usually issued by them
Timing effect on spread, with "hot isues" market leading to lower spread, of greater benefit to
larger firms that have better timing control of their public issues
Total direct costs much lower for larger sales and larger assets companies
No warrants as part of compensation for larger company deals
Outcomes
Larger dollar volume transactions have larger syndicates of underwriters
Sale of underwritten stock completed expeditiously; selling problems for non-underwritten
issues of a few smaller firms
Large underwriters distribute stock more widely
Higher first day price appreciation for larger companies, but difference not sustained over
longer time periods; timing of "hot issues" market also affects first day appreciation
No differences in perceived effects of public ownership, although some smaller firms feel they
had acted prematurely
Larger companies rate after-market advantages regarding help in acquisitions as more
important than small companies; larger companies feel more positive also about benefits
from sale of founder stock and enhanced attractiveness of employee stock options
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Figure 1. Partial Sales of Non-Underwritten Issues
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